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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff -Respondent " 
. i 
vs. 
i 
SAMUEL S. TAYLOR : Case No. 13949 • 
Defendant -Appellant ' 
i 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT ' 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellant, SAMUEL S. TAYLOR, appeals from the finding of • 
guilty of the crime of operating a business without a valid Salt Lake County 
Business license entered against him in Third Judicial District Court. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT ' 
On November 11, 1974, this came on for trial de novo. Following 
stipulation as to the facts and arguments by counsel for the state and , 
Mr. Taylor, appearing pro se, Judge Bryant H. Croft found the defendant 
guilty as charged and sentenced him to payment of a fine. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the lower court on the grounds that the 
statute charged is violative of provisions of the United States and Utah 
Constitution. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Appellant was charged with violation of Section 11-9-3 of the 
Salt Lake County Ordinances. It was alleged that on or about the 27th 
day of November, 1973, he operated the Taylor Hearing Service in 
Salt Lake County without obtaining a business license. 
Mr. Taylor waived a jury trial and agreed to stipulate to the 
facts and stated that he desired to present arguments going to the 
constitutionality of the statute under which he was charged. Accordingly, 
Appellant stipulated that on the 27th day of November, 1973, he did 
operate Taylor Hearing Service in Salt Lake County without a valid 
1973 business license. Further, it was stipulated by Mr. Taylor and 
counsel for the state that Mr. Taylor operated a hearing service from his 
home at 3682 South 500 East, which is within unincorporated Salt Lake 
County; and that he had done so since 1968; that he had no employees other 
than himself; that he did a gross business of less than $10,000.00; and that 
he did not pay the required $7.50 fee as required by Section 11-9-2 of 
the ordinances of Salt Lake County for the year 1973 for those businesses 
having gross sales of less than $10,000.00 for the preceding calendar 
year. 
Based upon the above mentioned stipulation, Mr. Taylor moved 
for dismissal of the case on the grounds that the ordinance requiring payment 
of a business license is unconstitutional. Following arguments from both 
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sides, after which the Court took the motion of Mr. Taylor under 
advisement. On December 2, 1974, the Court, in a memorandum 
opinion, found no merit to the defendant's motion and upon the basis of the 
stipulated facts found the defendant guilty as charged. 
On December 9, 1974 the Appellant was sentenced to payment of 
a fine. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE BUSINESS LICENSE IS A VIOLATION OF APPELLANTS 
RIGHT TO EQUAL PROTECTION UNDER THE LAW IN THAT SAID 
LICENSING STATU!E DISCRIMINATES AGAINST THE SMALL BUSINESSMAN. 
APPELLANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS DUE TO UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF 
THE AFORESAID STATUTE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED. 
Under the terms of Section 11, Chapter 9 of Salt Lake County 
i 
Ordinances the licensing provisions are intended solely as a revenue 
I 
generating measure. Section 11-9-15 provides that M(t)his ordinance
 ( 
is enacted solely to raise revenue for county purposes. M This act is i 
undertaken under the ostensible authority of Section 17 -5 -27, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953, which provides that counties" may license for 
purpose of regulation and revenue all and every kind of business . . . ,r 
This grant of power is , in turn, based upon the Constitutional authority 
given to the Legislature to do so by Article XIII, Section 5 of the State 
Constitution. 
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However, the mere grant of authority to tax does not grant to 
local authorities the right to impose arbitrary, capricious or grossly 
unfair taxation burdens upon its citizens. As this Court held in 
Orem City, v. Pyne^ 16 U 2d 355, 401 P2d 181 (1965), a local ordinance 
which placed some businesses on a flat-fee basis with about 1/12 as 
much tax as other businesses which were taxed on sales -tax basis 
was unconstitutionally discriminatory. 
The disparate nature of the taxation in this case is quite extreme. 
The appellant would be required to pay $7. 50 per year as an operator of 
a business with gross earnings of less than $10,000.00. While large 
corporations with gross earnings several thousand times that of the 
earnings of the Appellant are subject to a maximum of a ten-fold increase 
in license costs. 
While the local governments may constitutionally impose taxes 
for various purposes (Salt Lake City v. Christensen Co. , 34 U. 38, 
95 P. 523 (1908), it has an obligation to tax proportionally throughout 
the tax base. The provisions of Section 11-9-2 place such a disproportionate 
burden upon the small businessman that it must be considered a violation 
of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution. The maximal fee of $750.00 when applied as a revenue 
generating measure to the larger corporations in Salt Lake County must 
be considered as being only nominal in nature, and consequently, the 
larger corporations are effectively excluded from the class being taxed. 
Such a consequence must be seen as sufficiently disparate to dictate 
constitutional prohibition. « 
POINT II i 
m 
THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE DICTATES THAT CLASSIFICATIONS 
MAY BE MADE UPON A REASONABLE BASIS. CLASSIFICATION OF SOLE m 
OPERATORS AS BUSINESSES IS ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS. THEREFORE • 
THE ORDINANCE SHOULD BE OVERTURNED AS BEING VIOLATIVE OF 
THAT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION. " 
i 
In considering Mequal protection of the laws" the guiding principles 
frequented asserted by various courts is that all persons in like circumstances g 
be treated alike. Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection and Ins. Co. v. Harrison 
£ j 
301 U.S. 459, 81 L. Ed. 1223, 57 S. Ct. 838. As a corollary to this , 
definition of equal protection, classifications which have some rational ' 
« basis are generally upheld. 
However, the mere fact that common parlance assigns to huge , 
prof it-making organizations and single operators the same term, i. e. 
''business," should not be allowed to obfuscate the central fact that they 
have little, if anything, in common. 
Section 11-9-3 of Salt Lake County ordinances defines "business" 
as "all activities . . . carried on for the purpose of gain or economic 
profit. " The definition specifically exempts employees from its scope. 
In actual fact, the person who I have denominated as a "sole operator'T 
bears a much stronger financial resemblance to an employee than to a 
true "business. " In the instant case, Mr. Taylor probably does precisely 
those things he would do as an employee of a hearing aid business, except 
he apparently makes less money than he would as an employee. In fact 
we donominate such a person as being "self-employed. " 
In the case of Provo City v. Provo Meat, 49 U 528, 165 P. 477 
(1917), the Utah Supreme Court held that ordinances like the one 
presently before the court were "occupational taxes" and consequently 
not regulatory in nature. If this is true then employee occupations 
have been arbitrarily excluded. 
To counter this, it may be said that since under the terms of Section 
17-5-27, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 counties are not authorized to license 
employees, but rather only businesses. However, this only shifts the 
arbitrariness from the county to the legislature and does not validate the 
classification. The fact that the legislative sanction has allowed discrimination 
against small businesses is simply further proof that the current situation 
is the product of legislative caprice. 
J^OINT^III^ 
THE STATUTES PROVIDING FOR TAXATION OF BUSINESS 
LICENSES IS ARBITRARY IN THAT IT EXCLUDES INSURANCE AGENTS 
FROM THE TAX. THIS IS VIOLATIVE OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION 
CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT. 
Insurance businesses are specifically excluded from the revenue 
generating taxation provided for by the statute before us. The legislature 
established a £eguL^ry licensing procedure in lieu of all other licenses 
and fees in Section 31-14-4 (5) Utah Code Annotated (1953). 
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At first blush it appears that since the legislature has set up 
licensing on a state level, that that would preclude business licensing 
on a county level. However, as the court points out in P£0Y^.^lyjZi-
Provo Meat and Packing Co. J op. cit.) a regulatory license can in no way 
be considered to take the place of a revenue license. Therefore, the legislature, 
for no apparent reason, has exempted insurance agencies from business 
licenses by excluding the power to tax them from powers granted to 
counties, from the above it follows that since the grant of power to the 
counties arbitrarily excludes insurance agencies, it violates the equal 
protection clause of the United States Constitution. 
CONCLUSION 
The imposition of the requirement of a business license is unfair 
to the appellant in that it denies him Equal Protection under the laws as 
provided by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. 
Therefore, Section 11-9-3 is invalid as an abuse of authority delegated 
to Salt Lake County or because the statute under which that was granted 
is unconstitutionally discriminatory. Therefore the judgement from the 
Court below should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BRAD RICH 
Attorney for Appellant 
